I am currently Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University. My work is primarily in epistemology and philosophy of religion, with a focus on issues concerning fallibilism, epistemic modals, invariantism, and knowledge norms. The project of my dissertation was to offer a systematic defense of fallibilist invariantism.
(2012- 2014): Postdoctoral Research. New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Project, directed by John Hawthorne.
Ph.D., Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 2007-2012.
Dissertation: “Why I Can Know I Will Lose the Lottery: A Defense of Stable Fallibilism”
Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals (2014) Philosophical Studies, 167 (3): 597-606.
On the Intimate Relationship of Knowledge and Action (2015) Episteme. 12 (3): 343-353.
Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes (with John Hawthorne) (forthcoming) Oxford Studies in Epistemology. volume 6.
Putting Fallibilism to Work (forthcoming) in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. OUP.
Defeat, Testimony, and Miracle Reports (forthcoming) in Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. OUP.
Divine Hiddenness: Defeated Evidence (forthcoming) Philosophy.
Divine Hiddenness: Defeated Evidence. Oxford University, May 2015.
Defeat, Testimony, and Miracle Reports. Rutgers University, May 2014.
Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes. Oxford University, March 2013.
Putting Fallibilism to Work. APA Pacific Division Meeting, Seattle. April 2012.
Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals. APA Central Division Meeting, Chicago. February 2012.
On the Intimate Relationship of Knowledge and Action. APA Eastern Division Meeting, Washington D.C. December 2011.
Concessive Knowledge Attributions, Fallibilism, and Intra-subjective Modal Flexibility. Invited presentation. Northwestern University. November 2011.
Concessive Knowledge Attributions, Fallibilism, and Intra-subjective Modal Flexibility. Invited Presentation. Epistemology Workshop. University of Arkansas. September 2011.